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THE COMPOSITION OF STRIKE ACTIVITY
IN THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY
DAVID B. LIPSKY and HENRY S. FARBER
T HE construction industry may be themost strike-prone industry in the
American economy: since the end of
World War II there have been nearly
25,000 construction strikes, accounting
for approximately 20 percent of the na-
tion's strike activity. In the turbulent
1960s about 22 percent of both the num-
ber of strikes and the number of man-
days lost because of strikes were attribu-
table to construction stoppages. Yet
over the same period the construction
work force constituted only about 5 per-
cent of the nonagricultural labor force.'
This study shows that strikes in construction
have, by most measures, increased during the
years since 1949, a period during which strike
activity tended to decline in American industry
as a whole. The authors demonstrate that this
increase has resulted not from an increase in
the number of wage disputes but from a grow-
ing number of jurisdictional strikes and the
increasing severity of economic and union-
organizing strikes. They also show that the
number of strikes in construction does not vary
significantly with the unemployment rate in
that industry nor with the presence of wage
controls, but both of those factors have a sig-
nificant impact on the composition of strike
activity in construction.
David B. Lipsky is Associate Professor in the
New York State School of Industrial and Labor
Relations, Cornell University. Henry S. Farber is
a graduate student in the Department of Eco-
nomics at Princeton University. They would
like to thank John Raudabaugh and Robert
Searle for their research assistance on this
project. This paper was submitted and ac-
cepted before Professor Lipsky assumed the
position of editor.-EITOR
'Major sources for data on construction
strikes include the following: U.S. Department
Construction workers are on strike
more frequently and lose more working
time than workers in any other industry.
Record levels of strike activity were re-
corded in 1969 when there were nearly
1,000 strikes and 20 million mandays lost
because of work stoppages. While work-
ers in the rest of the economy lost about
one-quarter of one percent of working
time because of strikes, construction
workers lost five times that amount. It
can be argued that this militancy on the
part of construction unions helped bring
about the large wage settlements in the
industry in 1969 and 1970 and, ultimate-
ly, wage conrtols in 1971.
In an address before the Convention
of the AFL-CIO Building and Construc-
tion Trades Department in 1971, John
of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Work
Stoppages in Contract Construction, 1946-66,
BLS Report No. 346 (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O.,
1968); E. A. Puglisi and A, Stolzberg, "Work
Stoppages, 1961-66: Construction and Other
Industries," reprinted in Construction Labor
Report, No. 657 (April 24, 1968), pp. B-2 to
B-9; U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of
Labor Statistics, Handbook of Labor Statistics
1972, Bulletin 1735 (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O.,
1972), pp. 345-56; U.S. Department of Labor,
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Analysis of Work
Stoppages 1972, Bulletin 1813 (Washington, D.C.:
G.P.O., 1974). In addition, unpublished data
were obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics for the years after 1967. For an excellent
survey of labor relations in construction, see
Daniel Quinn Mills, Industrial Relations and
Manpower in Construction (Cambridge, Mass.:
M.1.T. Press. 1972). Mtills discusses the industry's
strike problem on pp. 48-49 and 69-70.
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Dunlop, then chairman of the Construc-
tion Industry Stabilization Committee
(CISC), noted that "one out of three col-
lective bargaining agreements in 1970
resulted in a strike, whereas in American
industry generally, roughly one out of
20 agreements result in a work stoppage.
That record did not do credit to any of
us with interests or attachments to this
industry." Noting that the industry's
strike record represented "a failure of
collective bargaining," Dunlop told the
convention delegates, "Whether you like
it then, or not, it seems the situation
was somewhat out of control.' 2
In this paper we address ourselves to
the problem of strike activity in the con-
struction industry. Most previous strike
studies have been limited to analyses
aggregated across industries. Aggrega-
tion, however, may conceal more than it
reveals. Strike propensities are clearly
different across industries and over time,
so that estimates of strike determinants
based on aggregated data may be biased
or unstable.
Furthermore, it is not true that all or
even the great majority of strikes occur
over wages, an assumption implicit in
most previous studies. In fact, strikes also
occur over job security issues and other
working conditions, as a result of union
organizing drives, and because of juris-
dictional disputes between rival unions.
Such noneconomic strikes are particu-
larly common in the construction indus-
try. For example, over the postwar period
jurisdictional disputes accounted for
about one-third of all strikes in the in-
dustry, and in recent years there have
actually been more strikes on jurisdic-
tional questions than because of unre-
solved wage disputes. Jurisdictional stop-
pages, however, cannot always be
2Construction Labor Report, No. 843 (No-
vember 17, 1971), p. C-1.
attributed to a breakdown in labor-
management negotiations. Thus, failure
to account for the actual sources of
strike activity can lead to misleading
estimates of strike propensities.
It is also necessary to recognize that
no single measure can serve as an ade-
quate index of strike activity. Some of
the most important studies in this area
have examined only the number of
strikes. In this study we examine not
only strike frequency, but also other
relevant indices.
Strikes in Construction
The Chart traces the postwar record
of strike activity in the construction
industry and in all industries. The all-
industry figures show a general down-
ward trend from the Korean War period
through the early 1960s. (The large
number of mandays idle in 1959 is
largely the result of a single, 116-day
steel strike.) Throughout most of the
1960s, however, total strike activity in-
creased quite markedly; from 1960 to
1970 the number of mandays idle, for
example, increased by nearly 250 percent.
For the construction industry the eye
perceives no downward trend at all. Al-
Chart. Number of Strikes and Mlandays
Idle-All Industries and Construction
Industry-1948-72.
4. 7- 6
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,€ o1 ~
- e sk ' "'
HeinOnline  -- 29 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 389 1975-1976
INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW
though there is clearly year-to-year varia-
tion, the drift in both the number of
strikes and mandays idle appears to be
steadily upward for most of the postwar
period. In fact, from 1949 to 1970 the
number of construction strikes increased
by 85 percent and the number of man-
days idle by 450 percent.
The Chart presents some evidence of
a restraining effect on strike levels dur-
ing the three postwar periods when an
active incomes policy was pursued (1951-
52, 1962-66, and 1971-72). This is par-
ticularly true for measures of time lost.
After the creation of the CISC in 1971,
Dunlop continually emphasized that
wage stabilization was only part of the
committee's tasks and that dispute settle-
ment was an equally important func-
tion.3 Subsequently he credited CISC
with significantly reducing the strike
level in construction in 1971 and 1972. 4
The number of strikes dropped, in fact,
from 1,137 in 1970 to 751 in 1971 and
701 in 1972, the lowest levels recorded
since 1955. Mandays idle also dropped by
more than 50 percent in 1971, after the
creation of CISC.
The Nixon controls program, however,
also appears to have had a similar impact
on total strike activity in 1971 and 1972,
and yet mandays idle for all strikes
dropped by about 30 percent in 1971,
even though Phase I did not go into
effect until August-a fact suggesting
that other restraining forces may have
been at work in the economy as a whole
and perhaps also in construction. On the
3See, for example, Construction Labor Report,
No. 858 (March 8, 1972), p. A-18 and No. 904
(January 31, 1973), p. A-12.
4Construction Labor Report, No. 904 (Janu-
ary 31, 1973), p. A-Il to A-12. This article
recounts Dunlop's testimony before the Senate
Banking Committee on the Administration's
proposal for a one-year extension of the Eco-
nomic Stabilization Act.
other hand, it appears the Korean War
controls and the Kennedy wage guide-
lines also had an impact on construction
strike activity. Time lost because of con-
struction strikes reached postwar lows in
1951 and 1963, years when there was
heavy government pressure to restrain
wage increases. The apparent effect of
the Kennedy guidelines on construction
strike activity is odd, however, because
it is generally agreed that this voluntary
wage control program had little impact
on other facets of construction collective
bargaining5 Obviously this question of
the effects of controls requires more sys-
tematic analysis, which we will provide
later in this paper.
For purposes of analysis, we divide
construction strike activity into five
categories according to the major cause
of the stoppage:
Total. This category contains stop-
pages occurring for any reason and is
the sum of the other four plus a residual
category that cannot otherwise be
classified.6
Economic. This category includes any
stoppage that stems principally from a
dispute over wage changes, wage adjust-
ments, hours of work, and supplementary
benefits.
Working conditions. This category in-
cludes disputes arising over job security
issues, contract administration, and other
noneconomic contractual matters. It in-
cludes both strikes over the negotiation
of new contract terms and strikes during
the term of the contract; unfortunately,
the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
does not subdivide the strike data to
permit us to distinguish grievance strikes.
;See, for example, John Sheahan, The Wage-
Price Guideposts (Washington, D.C.: The
Brookings Institution, 1967), pp. 38-40.
6 Less than one percent of measured strike
activity is included in the residual category for
all strike measures and in all years.
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Union organizing and security. This
category includes strikes arising from
efforts by unions to organize unorganized
workers, obtain a representation election
from the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB), gain recognition from
the employer, and win various forms of
union security.
Jurisdictional. This category includes
all stoppages arising from interunion and
intraunion rivalries. If two unions com-
pete over the organization of a particu-
lar group of workers and a strike results,
it is classified in this category. A more
typical jurisdictional dispute, however,
involves competition over jobs rather
than workers, In the construction induts-
try, it is common to have two unions
disagree on the proper assignment of
work. If a contractor assigns jobs to
members of Union A, Union B may
strike to force a reassignment of the
work.
Clearly, as the BLS notes, "The issues
in dispute in most strikes are many and
varied, and do not always lend them-
selves readily to immediate and exact
classification.' '" Over the years, however,
the BLS has developed considerable ex-
pertise in the proper classification of
strikes by issue, and the categories em-
ployed here are broad enough so that
classification errors are minimized.
The classification of strikes by cause
does not include consideration of the
legal status of the strike.s For example,
almost all jurisdictional strikes are viola-
tions of Section 8(b)(4)(D) of the Taft-
Hartley Act. Also, it is well known that
secondary boycotts, an unfair labor prac-
7U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor
Statistics, BLS Handbook of Methods, Bulletin
1711 (Washington, D.C.: GPO., 1971), p. 162.
Further information on the methods used by
the BLS to classify strikes is available in this
source.
tice under Section 8(b)(4)(B) of Taft-
Hartley, are a common occurrence in the
construction industry.) Most of the
union-organizing strikes probably violate
Section 8(b)(4)(C) or 8(b)(7) of Taft-
Hartley. In addition, many strikes over
"working conditions" are strikes in
contravention of no-strike provisions in
collective agreements and are subject to
both contract remedies and damage
suits.10 There is no way of estimating
the proportion of construction strike
activity that may be unlawful, but an
index of the magnitude is provided by
the numnber of court injunctions issued
against strikes by construction workers.
In most years, more injunctions are is-
sued against strikes in construction than
in any other industry in the private
sector."
Measures of Strike Activity
Our earlier discussion focused on two
measures of strike activity: number of
strikes and mandays idle. Additional
measures are required to understand the
S"All stoppages, whether or not authorized by
tile union, legal or illegal, are counted." Ibid.,
p. 159.
Often secondary strikes are the result of
common situs picketing. Such picketing was
declared an unfair labor practice in NLRB v.
I)enver Building Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675.
Between 1958 and 1968 the NLRB heard 82
cases involving the issue of secondary strikes;
by far the largest number, 46, involved con-
struction tnlions. See Patli A. Brinker, "Second-
arv Strikes and Picketing," Labor Law Journal,
Vol. 23, No. II (November 1972), pp. 681-82.
Brinker and Taylor found that construction
uttnions were in'olved in 63 percent of 548
secondary boycott cases heard by the NLRB
between 1958 and 1970. See Paul A. Brinker
and Benjamin J. Taylor, "Secondary Boycott
Analysis by Industry," Labor Law Journal, Vol.
24, No. 10 (October 1973), pp. 671-73.
-0Boys Market, Inc., v. Retail Clerks Union,
Local 1770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
"See, for example, U.S. Department of Labor,
Analysis of W~ork Stoppages, 1971 (Vashington,
D.C.: G.P.O., 1973), p. 59.
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full dimensions of strike activity. Some
researchers have devoted considerable
energy to delineating the "shape" of in-
dustrial conflict on the grounds that
there must be a relationship between
shape and effectiveness. Hicks, for ex-
ample, argued that long strikes must
result in employer victories: "To fight
out to the bitter end can only mean go-
ing back upon the employers' terms",
l
2
Knowles, in his classic examination of
British strike experience between 1911
and 1938, also concluded that unions
were victorious when strikes were num-
erous, large, and short, and that employ-
ers tended to win when strikes were few,
small, and long.13 Studies by Shorter and
Tilly and by Britt and Galle view union-
ization as the means of mobilizing
worker protest and making it more effec-
tive. The rise of unionization over the
past century has led to more frequent,
broader, but shorter strikes, and, infer-
entially, to greater strike effectiveness for
workers. 14
Following Britt and Galle, we use
these symbols to denote measures of
strike activity:
WS
MDI
WI
= number of work stoppages
= number of mandays idle
= number of workers in-
volved in work stoppages
1-'John Richard Hicks, The Theory of Wages
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1968), p. 145.
13K.G.J.C. Knowles, Strikes: A Study in
Industrial Conflict (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
1954), pp. 240-59.
14Edward Shorter and Charles Tilly. "The
Shape of Strikes in France, 1930-1960," Coln-
parative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 13.
No. 1 (January 1971), pp. 60-86; David Britt
and Omer R. Galle, "Industrial Conflict and
Unionization," American Sociological Review,
Vol. 37, No. 1 (February 1972), pp. 46-57; David
Britt and Omer R. Galle, "Structural Antece-
dents of the Shape of Strikes: A Comparative
Analysis," American Sociological Review, Vol.
39, No. 5 (October 1974), pp. 642-51.
and we add the following symbols:
MDW = number of mandays worked
in the industry
WKRS = number of workers em-
ployed in the industry.
Thus we can define the
ponents of strike activity:
Component
Frequency
Relative frequency
Volume
Relative volume or
severity
Breadth or size
Intensity or duration
Scale
following com-
Measure
WS
WS/MD IV,
WS/IWKRS
MDI
MDI/MDW,
MDI/WKRS
WI /WS
MDI/ WI
MDI/WS
In the regression models that follow
we will use five of the above measures:
frequency (WS), relative frequency (WS/
MDW), volume (MDI), relative volume
(MDI/MDW), and scale (MDI/WS). We
are prohibited from using separate meas-
ures of size and duration because data
on workers involved (WI) by the major
causes of construction strikes are avail-
able only for years through 1967. Note,
however, that scale is the product of size
and duration. That is,
MDI WI MD1
(1S 147S WI
Thus, scale is an adequate proxy for
duration if size is relatively constant. In
the construction industry, data for all
stoppages show that the average strike
for the period 1946-67 involved 385
workers; yearly means over this period
generally fell within 150 of the mean for
the entire period.15 The yearly variation
in mean duration, however, was propor-
5The one exception was 1952 when the mean
was 849. The range for other years was from
248 (1963) to 552 (1953).
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tionally much greater, ranging from 5
to 25 days. Therefore, variation in the
scale of construction strikes results prin-
cipally from variation in their duration.
It is worth noting that the average
size of construction strikes is consider-
ably smaller than the size of strikes for
all industries. In Table I it can be seen
that the average construction stoppage
involved 352 workers in 1967, while the
all-industry average was 624 workers.
Two hypotheses are suggested to ex-
plain the smaller size of construction
strikes. First, it may be the result of the
decentralized nature of collective bar-
gaining in the industry. Since negotia-
tions in the industry are usually carried
on between local craft organizations and
contractor associations, one might not
expect strikes of considerable breadth.
Second, it may be caused by the high
incidence of construction strikes over
noneconomic issues. Grievance strikes,
organizing strikes, and jurisdictional
disputes, after all, usually involve smaller
numbers of workers than strikes over
wages and other money items.
The evidence suggests that the second
hypothesis is probably correct. The data
in Table 1, giving size and duration sta-
tistics for 1967 (the last year for which
conplete information is available), show
that the average strike over economic
issues involved almost as many workers
in construction as in "all industries" and
was of even longer duration in construc-
tion. The small size of construction
strikes is therefore principally attribu-
table to the high incidence and smaller
size of noneconomic stoppages in the
industry, not to the structure of bargain-
ing on wage issues.
Although the variance in the size of
economic stoppages in construction is
relatively small, there are a few "statis-
tical outlyers," indicating that the large
economic strike is not an unknown oc-
currence in the industry. For example,
of 18 strikes involving 10,000 or more
workers in 1972, 10 occurred in the con-
struction industry; in fact, the largest
stoppage in any industry in that year
involved 70,000 carpenters and plasterers
who struck the Builders Association of
Chicago.16 This was (luring a period
when CISC applied all the pressure it
could muster to reduce conflict in the
industry.
16U.S. Department of Labor, Analysis of Work
Stoppages, 1972, pp. 12-13.
Table 1. The Average Size and Duration of Work Stoppages in All Industries and
in Construction, 1967.
All Industries
Average Size Average Duration
(14'I/WS) (MDI/ W1)
Construction Industry
Average Size Average Duration( it/ 9 (MVDI/11I)
All stoppages 624 workers 14.7 days 352 workers 16.9 days
Stoppages over:
Economic issues 808 16.0 710 20.0
Working conditions 621 4.8 254 7.4
Union organizing and
security 195 56.6 104 11.0
Jurisdiction 217 8.8 168 11.0
Source: All-industries figures are derived from U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Handbook of Labor Statistics 1972 (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1972), Table 157, p. 341.
Stoppages
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A Regression Model
How can variations in construction
strike activity over the postwar period
be explained? The literature led us to
examine five hypotheses concerning the
movement of construction strike levels.
Our preliminary explorations caused us
to concentrate on a linear regression
model combining three of the hypo-
theses. The variables included in our
final model follow:
Trend. Many researchers have dis-
covered evidence of a declining level of
strike activity over time. Arthur Ross
and Paul Hartman found this to be
markedly true in northern European
countries and somewhat true of the
United States. They referred to this as
"the withering away of the strike. ' '1 7
Ross and Hartman attributed the declin-
ing propensity to strike in North Amer-
ica to several factors, particularly "the
abatement of rivalry within the union
movement.-' They also credited changes
in employer attitudes, a growing centrali-
zation of bargaining, and a greater in-
volvement of unions in political action
as contributing to the decline in strike
activity.?9
Ashenfelter and Pierce found that for
the period 1945-63 four of five tested
measures of strike activity (VS, MDI,
MDI/MDW, WI) showed a significant
negative trend. (MDI/WI had an insig-
nificant trend coefficient.)20 These au-
thors considered the decline in industrial
conflict to be consistent with a sociologi-
cal theory presented by Dubin: "First,
'TArthur M. Ross and Paul T. Hartman,
Changing Pattern of Industrial Conflict (New
York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960), pp. 42-61.
'slbid., p. 164.
'glbid., pp. 161-171.
20Orley Ashenfelter and William S. Pierce,
"Industrial Conflict: The Power of Prediction-
Comment," Industrial and Labor Relations Re-
view, Vol. 20, No. 1 (October 1966), pp. 92-95.
as time passes during which groups of
people practice specified forms of be-
havior, institutions develop which tend
to stabilize that behavior. Second, as such
institutionalization occurs, individuals
and groups acquire an interest in per-
petuating the stabilized systems of be-
havior."21 The well-known paper that
Ashenfelter later coauthored with John-
son analyzed the number of strikes be-
ginning in each quarter from 1952 to
1967 and showed, through use of a model
that included several other variables,
that the volume of aggregate strike ac-
tivity exhibited a significant downward
trend over that period. Ashenfelter and
Johnson accounted for this decline by
pointing to the changing composition
of strike activity, particularly the decline
in strikes resulting from union-organiz-
ing campaigns and over unsettled
grievances. -22
Our earlier discussion of the strike
record in construction revealed an ap-
parent upward trend throughout most
of the postwar period, at least for the
measures WIS and MDI. Certainly the
strike does not- appear to be withering
away in the construction industry. It is
therefore of some interest to discover if
all mneasures of construction strikes show
an upward trend and if the composition
of strike activity affects the overall trend.
Unemployment. One of the clearest
results of industrial relations research is
that strikes follow the business cycle, or,
in other words, that strikes and unem-
ployment are inversely correlated. This
2l1bid., p. 92. The theory is originally pre-
sented in Robert Dubin, "Industrial Conflict:
The Power of Prediction," Industrial and Labor
Relations Review, Vol. 18, No. 3 (April 1965),
pp. 352-63.
220rley Ashenfelter and George Johnson,
"Bargaining Theory, Trade Unions, and Indus-
trial Strike Activity," American Economic Re-
view, Vol. 59, No. 1 (March 1969), pp. 35-49.
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finding has been repeatedly confirmed
for the United States, Canada, and Great
Britain.23 The theoretical reasons for the
inverse relation do not need to be re-
peated here. The same arguments should
have relevance for the relation between
economic strikes and unemployment at
the disaggregated, industry level. But
whether noneconomic stoppages should
have the same relation to unemployment
is problematical and, as far as we know,
untested.
Wage Controls. The casual evidence
cited in Strikes in Construction (above)
indicated that the three postwar periods
of wage and price controls seemed to
have a restraining effect on strike levels.
As Dunlop made clear, it was the con-
scious aim of CISC to reduce strike levels
in construction, and Phases I and II of
general controls seemed to have an im-
pact on strike activity throughout in-
dustry.
Mitchell, in his analysis of the impact
of Phase II, found some evidence that
strike levels were decreased. He pointed
out, however, that wage controls dra-
matically increased the proportion of
one-year contracts negotiated in the con-
struction industry in 1971. In 1972,
therefore, an unusual number of con-
struction contracts expired and the op-
portunity to strike increased in that
2'-:or the United States, see Ashenfelter and
Johnson, "Bargaining Theory," and the refer-
enccs cited therein. See also Jack W. Skeels,
"Measures of U.S. Strike Activity," Industrial
and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 24, No. 4
(July 1971), pp. 515-25. For Canada, see John
Vanderkamp, "Economic Activity and Strikes in
Canada," Industrial Relations, Vol. 9, No. 2
(February 1970), pp. 215-30. (But note that
Vanderkamp finds a weaker, though still signi-
ficant, relation in Canada compared to the
United States.) For Great Britain, see John H.
Pencavel, "An Investigation into Industrial
Strike Activity in Britain," Economica, New
Series, Vol. 37, No. 147 (August 1970), pp. 239-56.
industry after the imposition of controls.
That suggests, in turn, that although the
low level of strike activity in the rest of
industry during Phase II may be attrib-
uted to the light bargaining calendar,24
this factor cannot be adduced as a reason
for the decline in construction strikes in
1972.
Ashenfelter and Johnson argued that
the Kennedy-Johnson wage guidelines
lowered the number of strikes by lower-
ing the wage rate acceptable to the
union at the point of contract expira-
tion."' In terms of Hicks's bargaining
model, this is equivalent to a leftward
shift of the union's "resistance curve.''26
All other things equal, such a shift
should lower both the value of the wage
settlement and the expected length of a
strike.
Pencavel pointed out, however, that if
"a policy of wage restraint is coupled
with attempts to moderate product price
increases, the employer will be more in-
transigent in the wage bargain in the
knowledge that his ability to pass on
wage increases in the form of higher
prices is more limited.' Again, in Hick-
sian terms, this is equivalent to a right-
ward shift of the employer's "concession
curve." Such a shift would put further
downward pressure on wage settlements,
but would increase the expected length
of a strike.
In the construction industry it is gen-
erally agreed that wage controls have
been more effective than price controls.
Therefore, we would expect periods of
wage controls to be associated with de-
24Daniel J. B. Mitchell, "Phase II Wage Con-
trols," Industrial and Labor Relations Review,
Vol. 27, No. 3 (April 1974), pp. 373-75.
5Ashenfelter and Johnson, "Bargaining
Theory," p. 47.
26Hicks, The Theory of Wages, pp. 136-58.27Pencavel, "An Investigation into Industrial
Strike Activity in Britain," p. 248.
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creases in economic stoppages in the
industry.
We tested two additional hypotheses
concerning the movement of strike
levels. A key variable in the Ashenfelter
and Johnson model is a moving average
of previous changes in real wages (AR).
Using quarterly data, Ashenfelter and
Johnson estimated a polynomial lag dis-
tribution in AR; specifically, changes in
real wages over the previous eight quar-
ters were estimated to have an impact
on current strike levels. The relation be-
tween strikes and ,R was found to be
clearly negative, suggesting that the
cumulative experience of strong advances
in real wages serves to dampen current
strike activity.2
s
Unfortunately, we have only annual
observations and therefore could not test
a quarterly lag distribution on -R. The
best we could do was to test the relation
between the change in real wages in con-
struction over the previous two years and
current strike activity. Although we tried
several formulations of this variable,
with all measures and categories of con-
struction strikes, the coefficients were pre-
dominantly insignificant. One might
expect lagged wage changes to have a
particular effect in the equations per-
taining to economic strikes. All co-
efficients for AR, however, were insignifi-
cant in this subgroup of equations. One
could speculate on why the results for
construction were so markedly different
from the Ashenfelter and Johnson re-
sults, but we prefer to be cautious since
we lacked the data to duplicate their
test precisely. Consequently, the AR
variable was dropped from our final tests.
The final variable we tested was sug-
gested in part by Ashenfelter and John-
2SAshenfelter and Johnson, "Bargaining
Theory."
son and in part by Philip Ross. Ashen-
felter and Johnson tested the possibility
that the passage of the Landrum-Griffin
Act in 1959 had a positive impact on the
amount of strike activity. The use of a
dummy variable confirmed the hypoth-
esis. After 1959 there seems to have been
a step-increase in aggregate strike
levels. 9 According to Ross, the Landrum-
Griffin Act "led to a fundamental shift
in the form of the [construction] indus-
try's hiring practices." Section 8(f) per-
mitted contracts that set up union re-
ferrals based on seniority, residence, and
experience. "Under the prodding of the
international unions who distributed to
their locals detailed model referral sys-
tems embodying Section 8(f)'s priorities,
thousands of locals formally adopted the
hiring hall."' 30 Employer opposition,
however, was intense and "many bitter
strikes took place." 
3
1
Accordingly, we tested for the effect of
the Landrum-Griffin Act on construc-
tion strike activity. This variable, how-
ever, did not have a significant impact,
and it was dropped in the final tests.
Part of the problem in testing the varia-
ble was its high collinearity with the
wage control dummy. Tests showed that
wage controls had considerably more im-
pact on strikes than the Landrum-
Griffin Act.
Empirical Results
Table 2 presents linear regression re-
sults using three independent variables
(trend, unemployment rate in construc-
tion, and a wage control dummy) and
twenty-five dependent variables repre-
senting our five measures of strike activ-
2Ibid., p. 47.
30philip Ross, "Origin of the Hiring Hall in
Construction," Industiial Relations, Vol. 11, No.
3 (October 1972), p. 377.
31Ibid.
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ity in each of five categories of strikes,
as previously discussed. -2 Annual obser-
vations for the time period 1949-71 are
used. The wage control dummy takes a
value of I in the years 1951, 1952, 1962
through 1966, and 1971. It would have
been desirable to test each period of
wage controls separately, but the small
number of observations precluded that
approach.
In order to correct for the possibility
of autocorrelation in the regressions, all
equations were estimated using an
autoregressive scheme devised by Coch-
rane and Orcutt.3 As shown in the last
column of Table 2, the tests indicated
that the ordinary least squares (OLS)
estimates could be accepted for sixteen
of the twenty-five equations. A first-order
scheme was used in six equations and a
second-order scheme in three. After the
application of the Cochrane-Orcutt tech-
nique, the Durbin-Watson statistics
shown in Table 2 indicate an absence
32deally one would want to add controls in
our regression tests for year-to-year variations
in bargaining opportunities. This could be ac-
complished if complete data were available on
yearly contract expirations in the industry. Un-
fortunately, the BLS only provides information
on expirations of contracts covering 1,000 or
more workers. It is our impression that the
one-year contract was the norm in construction
for a much longer period than in other indus-
tries, which suggests that our regression esti-
mates are not seriously biased. If multiyear
contracts have grown significantly over time,
the most serious impact would be on the trend
coefficients, which would be biased in a down-
ward direction. The other independent vari-
ables would be affected only if they correlated
with the omitted variable. With the exception
of Mitchell's finding concerning the effect of
Phase II on contract duration, noted above, we
have no evidence indicating that such correla-
tions are significant.
33D. Cochrane and G. H. Orcutt, "Applica-
tion of Least Squares Regressions to Relation-
ships Containing Auto-correlated Error Terms,"
Journal of the American Statistical Association,
Vol. 44, No. 245 (March 1949), pp. 32-61.
of positive autocorrelation in eighteen
equations and a value in the inconclu-
sive range in the other seven cases.
Trend. In the category "all stoppages,"
there is a significant positive trend for
four of the five measures. 3 4 Strikes in the
industry have not only tended to in-
crease in frequency, they have apparently
become more serious in volume and scale
(MDI and MDI/WS). Only relative fre-
quency (WS/MDW) shows no significant
trend. The high level of significance of
the absolute measures WS and MDI, and
the absence of a trend for WS/MDW,
indicate that the upward trend is pos-
sibly associated with a generally growing
economy and the increasing size of the
labor force in the industry.
Techniques of dealing with autocorrelation are
discussed in J. Johnston, Econometric Methods,
2d ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1972), pp. 262-
65. For the purposes of this study a simple first
order autocorrelation scheme of the form
Et = P t-1 + ut
was assumed and the Cochrane-Orcutt iterative
procedure was used to provide an estimate of p
(p). If p was significantly different from zero
at the 5 percent level and second order auto-
correlation could be ruled out on the basis of
the Durbin-Watson statistic, then the first order
Cochrane-Orcutt estimates were used. If ii was
not significantly different from zero, then OLS
estimates were used.
Where p was significantly different from zero
at the 5 percent level and second order auto-
correlation of the form
Et = P1 Et-1 + P2 "t-2 + ut
could not be ruled out by the Durbin-Watson
statistic, a second order Cochrane-Orcutt pro-
cedure was used to provide estimates of P, and
P2 (p and P )' If p, and P2 were both signifi-
cantly different from zero at the 5 percent
level, then the second order Cochrane-Orcutt
estimates were used. If not, the first order
Cochrane-Orcutt estimates were used. A flow
chart of this procedure is available from the
authors.
34Pencavel ("An Investigation into Industrial
Strike Activity in Britain," p. 252.) also found
a significant positive trend for construction
strikes in Britain.
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A growing construction labor force,
however, is not a sufficient explanation
for the positive trend coefficients, since
the trend variable has not produced the
same result in studies of strikes in other
industries. Obviously, many of the rea-
sons previous researchers have offered for
the general decline in the propensity to
strike do not apply to construction:
union rivalry has not appreciably abated
in the industry, bargaining has shown
no tendency-until recently-to become
more centralized, and the growing open
or "merit" shop movement signifies no
greater acceptance by many construction
employers of the institution of collec-
tive bargaining.
In addition, the peaceful procedures
used for settling noneconomic disputes
in other industries have been less suc-
cessful in construction. Because of the
nature of the industry, the building
trades must engage in continual organiz-
ing campaigns. The NLRB has always
had a difficult time using the certifica-
tion-election device in the industry, and
unions have often preferred to rely on
their "persuasive powers" to gain recog-
nition from contractors. Also, as noted,
jurisdictional disputes are endemic in the
industry, and the parties' efforts to solve
these disputes peacefully through the
National Joint Board grew increasingly
difficult through the period studied and,
indeed, virtually collapsed after the As-
sociated General Contractors withdrew
from the plan in 1969.3s Finally, al-
though grievance arbitration is provided
in over 90 percent of the contracts in
the industry, it is not ordinarily accom-
panied by an absolute ban on strikes
during the contract term. In a survey of
769 construction contracts in effect in
3 5Construction Labor Report, No. 843 (No-
vember 17, 1971), p. C-3.
1972-73, the BLS found that only 200
contained an absolute no-strike and no-
lockout clause. 31 The building trades
unions often retain the right to strike
during the term of a contract on selected
working rules, such as those governing
referral and hiring.
An examination of the trend coeffi-
cients in the other strike categories pro-
vides support for the belief that the
overall trend is not primarily the result
of a growing labor force. In the eco-
nomic-stoppages category, for example,
both WS and WS/MDW have negative
trend coefficients (though only the latter
is significantly different from zero).
NVhile the frequency of economic stop-
pages has tended to decline, those that
occur have tended to be more serious as
the trend coefficients for MDI and
MDI/WS indicate.
The major source of the increasing fre-
quency of construction strikes appears to
stem from the strong trend in jurisdic-
tional stoppages, which have increased
both in absolute (WS) and relative
(WS/MDW) terms. The trend coefficient
for jurisdictional disputes indicates that
the number of such stoppages increased
by 10 a year (ceteris paribus). In con-
trast to economic stoppages, however,
jurisdictional strikes have tended to be-
come less severe; the coefficients for
MDI, MDI/MDW, and MDI/WS are all
significantly negative.
In the category covering strikes over
working conditions, the trend variable
accounts for very little of the variance.
For union-organizing strikes, however,
the trend has been to larger, and presum-
ably more serious, confrontations, while
their relative frequency has declined.
36U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor
Statistics, Characteristics of Construction Agree-
ments, 1972-1973, Bulletin 1819 (Washington,
D.C.: G.P.O., 1974), p. 51.
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Thus, the overall increase in con-
struction strike frequency may be partly
the result of a growing labor force, but
appears to be mainly the result of a
larger number of jurisdictional strikes.
The increasing trend in measures in-
corporating mandays idle is, by contrast,
the result of the increasing seriousness
of economic and union-organizing
strikes.
Unemployment in Construction. The
number of work stoppages in construc-
tion does not appear to respond to the
unemployment rate in the industry. It is
the time lost due to strikes that responds
to cyclical changes ill the labor market.
In all but one category, the time-lost
measures (MDI, MDI/MDW, and MDI/
WS) have negative and significant co-
efficients. A slack labor market does not
seem to reduce the frequency of strikes
over wages, working conditions, and
jurisdictional issues. It does, however,
reduce the volume, size, and duration of
such disputes. In other words, unemploy-
ment does not reduce the union's ability
or willingness to initiate a strike, but it
may affect its ability to involve a large
number of workers for a long period of
time.
As unemployment increases in the in-
dustry, the arena of industrial conflict
appears to shift to union organizing and
security. The coefficients for IVS/MIDW,
MDI, and MDI/MDIV are all signifi-
cantly positive in the tinion-organizing
category. Unemployment apparently in-
creases the resistance of construction em-
ployers to union-organizing efforts.:1
37Gustman and Segal have noted the ten-
dency of construction unions to bargain on a
multicraft basis when unemployment is high
and to bargain independently and to engage in
"leap frogging" when unemployment is low.
See Alan L. Gustman and Martin Segal, "The
Skilled-Unskilled Wage Differential in Con-
struction," Industrial and Labor Relations Re-
Possibly it encourages contractors to
operate in both unionized and non-
unionized segments of the industry, i.e.,
to be "double-breasted." Slack markets
may induce some contractors to work
under a "merit" or open shop. The
building trades may then try to force
such employers to come under the union
umlbrella. The result is a higher level
of strike activity. When unemployment
is low, however, employer resistance to
union organizing decreases. In a tight
labor market the union becomes an as-
sured source of workers. Union-organiz-
ing strikes thus decrease.
The business cycle, then, has a strong
inspact on the composition of construc-
tion strike activity. A dlowntnrn in the
cycle reduces particularly time lost as a
result of economic and working-condi-
tions strikes but increases the strike fre-
quency and idleness resulting from
union-organizing attempts.
Wage Controls. The impact of wage
controls depends critically on the cate-
gory of strike considered. Controls clear-
ly tend to reduce conflict arising from
economic disputes. The coefficients or
all econonic strike measures are nega-
tive and significant at the .05 level. For
example, there tend to be almost 80
fewer economic strikes in a year in which
controls are in effect than one would
otherwise expect. This is almost a 25
percent reduction in the average postwar
level of economic strikes. There is an
even larger relative impact on MDI and
MDI/MDV. In Hicksian terms, the pre-
view, Vol. 27, No. 2 (January 1974), pp. 264-67;
see also Mills, Industrial Relations and Alan-
Power in Constriction, p. 34. The unions' at-
tempts to coordinate bargaining through the
creation of multicraft structures when markets
are slack may be resisted by employers and thus
lead to an increase in union-organizing and
security strikes.
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dominant effects of controls on eco-
nomic disputes is to shift the union's
resistance curve leftward.
On the other hand, wage controls
have no significant impact on union
organizing and jurisdictional strikes.
Obviously, these sources of potential dis-
cord are not the immediate concern of
administrators of a wage-control policy.
Government intervention has reduced
conflict over wages, but there has been
no apparent spillover effect to these
other categories. Moreover, wage con-
trols are associated with a significant in-
crease in the frequency of strikes over
working conditions. Apparently, con-
struction unions, unable to direct col-
lective pressure on wages during a period
of controls, redirect their energies in the
broad area of working conditions. His-
torically, wage controllers have not at-
tempted to restrain union pressures on
noneconomic issues during a period of
controls. In the construction industry,
years in which wage controls are in effect
have an average of 20 additional strikes
over working conditions. Since such
strikes constitute only 10 percent or so
of the average total in the industry, this
effect is not very substantial in the
aggregate. Indeed, wage controls seem to
have had no impact on the frequency
of total construction disputes but seem
to have reduced the volume and scale of
total stoppages.
Another method we used to assess the
relation between our independent vari-
ables and the composition of construc-
tion strike activity was to take a direct
measure of strike composition as a tie-
pendent variable. For example, in one
test the percentage of total yearly
strikes that were economic in nature
(ECON/TOT) was regressed on trend
(7), the unemployment rate in construc-
tion (U), and a wage control dummy
(J). The following result was obtained
(t-values are in parentheses):
(2) ECON/TOT =
.5889 - .0090T - .0052U - .0787J
(11.41) (4.928) (1.306) (3.180)
R2= .681 D.W. = 1.3132
For the entire postwar period, eco-
nomic stoppages constitute 42 percent of
total stoppages in the industry. The re-
gression results indicate the following:
(1) there is a definite downward trend
in the proportion of strikes arising over
economic matters, (2) there is no rela-
tion between the state of the construc-
tion labor market and the proportion of
economic strikes, and (3) wage controls
definitely are associated with a lower
proportion of economic stoppages in the
industry. These results are fully consis-
tent with the results displayed in Table
2, which show, for example, that the
unemployment rate does not affect the
frequency of strikes in any category but
does decrease the time lost for all but
union-organizing strikes. Experiments
with other dependent variables that
might serve as direct measures of strike
composition also served to verify the
results in Table 2.3s
Summary and Conclusions
Our principal results can be sum-
marized as follows:
(.) Strikes in the construction indus-
try became an increasingly serious prob-
lem in post World War II industrial
relations. Although other studies have
shown a general declining trend in U.S.
strike activity, strikes in construction
have, by most measures, tended to in-
crease.
(2.) The increasing trend is partly the
result of the increasing severity of eco-
3These results are available from the authors
on request.
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nomic and union-organizing strikes and
partly the result of the industry's in-
ability to solve the problem of jurisdic-
tional disputes.
(3.) The state of the construction
labor market has a pronounced effect on
the composition of strike activity. Time
lost as a result of strikes over economic
issues and working conditions decreases
in a slack market, but conflict in the
area of union organizing and security
increases.
(4.) Finally, wage controls have signifi-
cantly dampened discord on economic
issues, but the number Of strikes over
working conditions has increased during
periods of controls. Federal intervention
seems to have had, on net, a minor
effect on the frequency of labor-manage-
ment disputes in the industry and a
negative effect on the time lost due to
these disputes.
Several knowledgeable observers of
the industry believe that the craft boards
that operated under CISC served to re-
duce the level of strike activity resulting
from wage disputes. As Dunlop com-
mented, while chairman of CISC, "The
first thing this industry needs across the
board is dispute settling machinery on
a national level in all branches. . . . I
would like to see our craft boards or
some combination of them evolve in the
period ahead into effective national ma-
chinery to resolve disputes over the terms
of collective bargaining agreements."3 9
It is problematical, however, whether
such boards, without the ultimate threat
of sanctions available through CISC,
can truly serve as an effective dispute-
settlement mechanism. Continued ex-
perimentation with the use of craft
boards may be a worthwhile endeavor,
39Construction Labor Report, No. 843 (No-
vember 17, 1971), p. C-3.
but our results do not lead to the con-
clusion that increased federal interven-
tion in the industry's collective bargain-
ing leads unambiguously to reduced
levels of conflict.
Problems over union organizing and
security will continue to mount as long
as the struggle between the open shop
movement and the building trades con-
tinues. The Associated General Contrac-
tors reported in 1974 that more than
half of its 3,000 member companies did
better than 50 percent of their work
with open shops.4 0 There has been an
increasing level of violence, as well as an
increasing number of strikes, reported in
open shop struggles.41 We have no ready
solution for this problem. Nevertheless,
our results suggest that strike activity
arising from union organizing can be
significantly reduced by maintaining full
employment in the industry. Govern-
ment policies to dampen severe demand
fluctuations endemic in the industry
would serve the cause of industrial peace
and would certainly be a remedy accept-
able to all parties.
Jurisdictional disputes have proven a
most intractable problem for the indus-
try. Our results show that as the fre-
quency of jurisdictional strikes increased
over the post World War II period,
their severity declined. These disputes
have been a thorn in the side of the
industry, but are not particularly costly
compared to other sources of conflict.
Clearly, part of the explanation for the
trend in the frequency of jurisdictional
stoppages was the growing ineffectiveness
of the National Joint Board. In 1973
the industry succeeded in creating a new
40Construction Labor Report, No. 968 (May
1, 1974), p. A-8.
41lbid., and Construction Labor Report, No.
976 (June 26, 1974), p. A-2.
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mechanism for the settlement of juris-
dictional disputes."" Hopefully the new
procedure, which corrects many of the
deficiencies of the old Joint Board, will
prove an effective means of reducing
strikes over jurisdiction.
Many observers, including Dunlop,
have recommended regional or "wide
area" bargaining in the construction in-
dustry. We can only speculate on the
possible impact of more centralized bar-
gaining on strike activity. If the consoli-
dation of bargaining units would reduce
the number of contracts negotiated in
the industry, then clearly the (legal)
opportunity to strike over wages and
working conditions would also be re-
duced. But the propensity to strike,
given the opportunity provided by con-
tract expiration, might increase. Further-
more, it is almost certain that consoli-
dated bargaining would mean strikes of
larger size and breadth. \loreover, the
attempt to establish wide-area units
would probably be accompanied by
strikes in the "union-organizing and
security" category. Wide-area bargaining
might have many advantages for the
construction industry, but we are skep-
tical that it would serve to reduce the
strike problem.4a
3
42 Construction Labor Report, No. 922 (June
6, 1973), pp. E-1 to E-8.
43l September 1975, after this paper was
written, the Ford administration introduced a
bill, drafted by Secretary of Labor Dunlop,
that would restructure collective bargaining in
construction by giving national craft unions
sole authority to approve contracts negotiated
at the local level. Furthermore, the bill would
create a new labor-management committee that
could defer strikes for up to 30 days past con-
tract expiration. Under the bill, the committee
"may promote and assist in the formation of na-
tinnal craft or branch boards ... for the pur-
pose of attempting to seek resolution of local
labor disputes." The text of the bill is found
in Construction Labor Report, No. 1038 (Sep-
tember 10, 1975), pp. E-1 to E-3. This bill was
eventnally coupled with a controversial common-
situs picketing bill, however, and although the
joint measure passed both houses of Congress,
it was vetoed by President Ford in December
1975.
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